Analysis of Forgery Attacks on Parallelizable Authenticated Encryption Scheme (PAES)-8
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Abstract
The Parallelizable Authenticated Encryption Scheme (PAES)-8, designed by Ye et al. in 2014, claims to offer 128-bit authentication security in the nonce-misuse model. However, Sasaki and Wang's theoretical forgery attack on PAES-8 suggested vulnerabilities, proposing a universal forgery with a complexity of approximately 211. In this study, we implemented this forgery attack using the C programming language to evaluate its practicality. Our findings reveal that the attack, as initially proposed, cannot be executed without additional steps, which significantly increase its complexity to . These results suggest that PAES-8 may offer greater resistance to forgery attacks than previously anticipated, although further cryptanalysis is recommended, particularly in the nonce-respecting mode.
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